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Abstract 
Most research in mass atrocities, especially genocide is conducted at the macro level explor-
ing how mass violence is instigated, planned and orchestrated at the level of the state. This 
paper on the other hand suggests that more research of the individual perpetrator is needed 
to complement the understanding of mass atrocities. The author develops therefore a new 
model, the group violence strategy model. This model combines various traditional crimino-
logical models of group offending and proposes a three stage analysis, looking at the individ-
ual aggressor, the actions within the offender group and the actions between offender and 
victim group to understand better the phenomenon that ordinary people commit unspeakable 
crimes. 
I. Introduction 
When Sartre noted that ‘[t]he fact of genocide is as old as humanity’ (1971, 534) he stated a 
truth not only in relation to genocide in the legal sense but also to mass atrocities in general. 
‘Unimaginable atrocities’ as the Schabas (2012) poignantly titled his book are so difficult to 
understand not only because of the sheer number of victims but also the huge number of per-
petrators. Under normal circumstances we cannot comprehend how anybody could partici-
pate in killing let alone in mass killings. Further, not only are the victims civilians (often the 
most vulnerable members of the group) but the slaughter is often carried out by persons who 
previously were law-abiding citizens. Anybody who has not experienced mass violence will 
find it difficult to comprehend how a group of ordinary people are willing and capable to 
commit murder, let alone on such a large scale and with such barbaric cruelty. Even the 
thought of being part of an encouraging audience rather than attempting to stop the violence 
seems inconceivable. 
Much research tries to explain genocide and comparable atrocities by looking at it from a ho-
listic approach as one coherent phenomenon, such as “the Holocaust” or “the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide” and tries to identify the political, historical and sociological causes for the vio-
lence. Most of this work focuses subsequently on the macro level, namely the role of the state 
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in planning, instigating and ordering of the atrocity. This paper on the other hand argues that 
one must not lose sight of the fact that these massacres consists of individual acts committed 
during individual events and that it is important to examine not only those who plan and or-
chestrate the attacks but also paying attention to the low rank trigger- pullers who carry out 
the violence. These individual acts of violence are however nearly always committed in 
groups, it is equally necessary to understand the phenomenon of group offending in the con-
text mass atrocities. My research will therefore draw on traditional group offending theories, 
which have been developed in the context of ordinary crimes at national level, such as juve-
nile delinquency and gang crime. The situation of mass atrocities in the context of an armed 
conflict is, of course, too different to simply apply traditional criminological models. Instead 
I argue that a number of traditional theories and models need to be combined into a new 
framework, which I call the group violence strategies model. While the details will be ex-
plained elsewhere, the aim of this article is to briefly set out the basic structure of this new 
approach. 
II. Gaps in Current Criminological Studies 
In spite of the importance of mass atrocities such as genocide both in the magnitude of vic-
timhood as well as moral standing of the ‘crime of crimes’, there are surprisingly few crimi-
nological theoretical approaches to these crimes (Pruitt 2014).1 A direct call for more crimi-
nological involvement in the study of genocide and in international criminal law in general 
was made Hagan & Rymond-Richmond (2009) in response to the atrocities in Darfur. They 
argued that genocide is a natural criminological concern and compared Darfur to a ‘crime 
scene’ and the Atrocities Documentation Survey to a ‘victimization survey’. Although it is 
acknowledged that this important work is a significant contribution to the understanding of 
mass violence, the authors concentrate on organised processes, what Gould (1999) would call 
the ‘supra-individual focus’. Indeed, a number of theories have been developed which help to 
understand large-scale violence in the field of state crime, often drawing on theories of organ-
isational crime (Pruitt 2014). However this research is increasingly criticised for over-empha-
sising the role of ideologies, as well as racial and ethnical prejudices (Karstedt 2012). Gerlach 
1A noteworthy example of criminological engagement in the studies of genocide is Brannigan and Hardwick 
who applied Gottfredson & Hirschi’s general theory of crime to genocide, adding to the concept of lack of self-
control the factor of opportunity as social circumstances that either restrain or advance participation in the 
crime. 
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argues that this is due to the agenda of researchers, and the “posthumous ethnicization of his-
tory in the post-1989 bourgeois triumphalism have reinforced this trend” (Gerlach 2006, p. 
465). 
Another criticism of current criminological research in the field is that it focuses too much on 
the atrocities in the Second World War. While this body of work is welcome because of its 
contribution to the knowledge and understanding of these specific historical events, it has to 
be noted that contemporary acts of atrocities are often very different from the state-orches-
trated atrocities within Nazi Germany or Stalin’s Russia. Today’s massacres often occur on a 
smaller scale as part of an internal conflict, and often the role of different groups change be-
tween perpetrator and victim. 
Contemporary mass violence is often embedded in trajectories of long-term conflict, and the 
majority of mass killings since the Second World War have been part of civil wars and ethnic 
conflicts […]. They typically occur beneath the level of the nation state and independently of 
its boundaries, and they evolve in the environment, social formations and complex actor con-
figurations of ‘extremely violent societies’ (Karstedt 2012, p. 500). 
It is important to note that the present paper does not attempt to explain the underlying mo-
tives and reasons for the enmity between groups but rather how this hostility manifests itself 
in horrendous violence. How is it possible that human beings not only deny the right of exist-
ence to another group but that they can overcome their natural tendency not to attack their 
own species? Furthermore, why is the violence carried out with such cruelty which goes far 
beyond killing members of the other group? 
III. Understanding Group Violence 
It is one of the shortcomings of traditional explanations of mass atrocities that they focus on 
polarisation of the groups and a strong command structure, and assume that once there is suf-
ficient motivation (usually based on religion, race or ethnic hostility) this can easily manifest 
as violence. Research has shown however that no matter how strong somebody’s motivations 
for aggression are, there is always a physiological confrontational barrier to violence which 
needs to be overcome (Collins 2013a). 
Therefore, the first step to understand the attacks is to examine the state of the offender at the 
time of the violence. Grossman has explored how a potentially violent situation influences a 
person on a physiological and emotional level and identifies a number of changes in the at-
tacker: 
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People’s facial expressions and body postures show a high level of tension; physiologically, 
heart beats often accelerate to 160 beats per minute, as cortisol and adrenaline flood the body; 
at these levels, fine motor coordination is lost, and people cannot easily control their fingers, 
hands, or feet (Collins 2013a, p. 135).2 
Based on these findings Grossman developed his theory of confrontational tension or fear 
which holds that irrespectively of their intent, human beings face a physiological and psycho-
logical barrier of committing violence against a fellow human being. 
Advances in the micro-sociology of violence show that violence is not easy but difficult, es-
pecially in close-range face-to-face confrontations, and that most people shirk the perfor-
mance of it even if the motivation exists and antagonists are very angry or vengeful. Most 
conflicts and the most typical expression of anger consist of dramatic bluster and bluff, threat-
ening a distant enemy but not actually doing much to violently attack someone (Klusemann 
2009, p. 2). 
 
In the context of military massacres there are countless example of soldiers who experienced 
mass executions as disgusting and stressful (Blom & Romijin 2002) without their behaviour 
before or after the event showing any evidence of moral scruples to the killings. Surprisingly, 
violent confrontations cause considerable stress not only on the victims but also on the attack-
ers. The inherent historical enmities between different groups fostered by propaganda and po-
larisation are therefore not sufficient to explain the commission of actual violence. Rather, an 
additional component is needed to overcome the physical barrier.  
This component can be found in Collin’s emotional energy model. According to this model 
the natural barrier to violence can be overcome by the attacker if they manage to raise their 
emotional energy above that of the victim.  
Winning or losing in a violent conflict is first of all a matter of who establishes emotional 
dominance; that side wins which holds together better, keeping up greater solidarity, and tak-
ing the initiate away from its opponent (Collins 2013b, p. 10). 
In the case of atrocities, one can observe that the mass killing erupt at the moment when the 
offending group establishes emotional energy dominance over the victimised group. Collins 
goes so far as claiming that “emotional dominance comes first and makes possible physical 
dominance” (Collins 2013b, p. 10). Where the emotional energy remains balanced, no mass 
2 See also Mazur (2009) on hormonal interpretations of this theory. 
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violence breaks out even though one group might be stronger in relation to weapons or num-
ber.  
It is argued here however that in addition to the physiological barrier to violence, other barri-
ers such as internalised values, morals, accepted social norms and the law are also operating. 
Emotional energy dominance can only be established if these ethical barriers are also over-
come. For this reason the model proposed in this paper, also draws on the neutralisation strat-
egies developed by Sykes & Matza. Analysing juvenile crime Sykes & Matza (1957) identi-
fied different techniques individual offenders use to neutralise the inner condemnation of 
their own actions and thus overcome ethical barriers. The group violence strategies model 
shows how in groups committing mass atrocities we can observe various group behaviours 
which support neutralisation strategies of the individual (see below). 
Another important theory for the group violence strategies model is the theory of patterns of 
violence by Klusemann (2012). Analysing the Srebrenica massacre Klusemann found recur-
rent patterns of how the violence developed throughout the atrocity. These patterns can be ex-
plained by the need of the offending group to employ a number of strategies to create and 
sustain emotional dominance over the victim group. These group dynamics however cannot 
be sufficiently explained without taking the strategies of the individual into consideration. An 
analysis of both individual and group strategies is therefore necessary. 
The aim of the paper is therefore to show that the combination of neutralisation and emo-
tional energy models can contribute significantly to the understanding of mass atrocites. In 
developing a new model I argue that the mesa-level of the group cannot be separated from the 
micro-level of the individual. The reason for this is that in order to understand the individual 
perpetrator’s decisions, the dynamics of the offending group as well as the interaction be-
tween offending and victimised group need to be clarified.3 The groups violence strategies 
model therefore attempts to explain what strategies the offending group employs to enable the 
individual to overcome his or her barrier to violence. In order to do this the model combines 
conventional criminological theories into a new three-stage analysis, proposing three distinct 
but inter-related levels of examination: At the first level of analysis, the model focuses on the 
individual, drawing the attention to the diversity of possible motives as well as the different 
neutralisation techniques. The second level examines group dynamics within the offending 
group, which facilitate the individuals’ neutralisation techniques and at the same time raise 
3 Further research is the needed to examine how these processes are facilitated on the macro-level. 
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the emotional energy of the group. The third level looks at how the offending group engages 
with the victimised group in order to create and maintain emotional dominance. In the fol-
lowing three sections I will explore how neutralisation and emotional dominance strategies 
are employed on individual, inter-group and intra-group levels and how this explains regular 
patterns of violence. Of course these strategies can overlap and different actions often fulfil 
functions on different levels.  
First, however, an explanation of the terminology is required. The concept of ‘group’ is diffi-
cult in the context of genocide and similar mass killings for two reasons. Firstly, there is a lot 
of debate as to what constitutes a group and how its membership can be identified (Schabas 
2000, pp. 106 et seqq ). Secondly, the categorisation of groups in either ‘offenders’ or ‘vic-
tims’ constitutes an oversimplification of historical events. For example the Kurdish tribes, 
who were so violently persecuted in the Ottoman Empire, committed numerals acts of vio-
lence themselves against the marching Armenians (Gerlach 2006). Likewise the Hutus have 
repeatedly been massacred by Tutsis and vice versa in the decades after Rwanda gained inde-
pendence (Karstedt 2013). Furthermore, each atrocity is shaped by a number of very different 
circumstances such as the causes and history of the animosity, the size and armament of the 
involved groups, the military or civilian constitution of the group, the context of the overall 
armed conflict and so on. Rather than referring to the group at macro-level, such as a certain 
religion or ethnicity, the group violence strategies model uses the term ‘group’ to describe the 
collective of people who are present at the specific event, i.e. a specific atrocity which is 
committed on the stated day or days. The ‘offender group’ is understood as the collective of 
all those individuals who participate in the violence against the ‘victim group’ which is un-
derstood as all those who suffer from the attack in this specific event.  
IV. Individual Strategies 
The group violence strategies model begins the analysis at the micro-level to explain the vio-
lence from the level of the individual perpetrator. As Mattani & Strickland (2006, p.502) 
point out:  
only individuals behave: the dynamics of collective action the therefore depend on under-
standing the contingencies that shape and maintain individual acts, as well as how those con-
tingencies interlock and interact to produce emergent collective and cultural processes. 
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Much research focusses on the origin of polarised group identities and the causes for one 
group attacking the other. When one looks however at the individual perpetrator who is car-
rying out the violence, one has to recognise that there are a plethora of different motives in 
addition or even instead of the intent to eliminate the group. One of the possible individual 
motivations is personal revenge for crimes which the attacker has previously suffered at the 
hands of members of the other group. In the case of Srebrenica for example, Serbs living in 
the villages nearby who had previously been targeted in Muslim raids now asked the attack-
ing soldiers to target specific individuals (Klusemann 2009). Another individual motivation 
for participation in the violence is simply material gain. Gerlach (2006) points out that part of 
the motives for the persecution of Armenians was the looting of the Armenian property which 
supported the development of the new Muslim commercial elite and the new nation-state. 
Staub (1999) even argues that the root of mass violence always lies in the “frustration of 
basic human needs and the development of destructive modes of need fulfilment” (at 181). In 
addition, atrocities are often connected with the trafficking of weapons and drugs and the ille-
gal exploitation of natural resources (Karstedt 2013). 
The diversity of motives shows the complexity of the phenomena and the short-comings of 
monocausal macro-level explanations. It does not however explain the immense cruelty in 
which these massacres are carried out and why very similar patterns can be observed in very 
different atrocities. It is hoped that the group violence strategies model can fill this gap. 
1. Neutralisation  
The first step when analysing perpetrators of mass atrocities is to explore the individual neu-
tralisation strategies. This theory argues that delinquent behaviour is not so much a rejection 
of certain norms but rather an “unrecognised extension of defences to crimes” (Sykes & 
Matza, p. 666) in which the offender believes that the concrete situation justifies their acts. In 
this way, non-acceptable behaviour is rationalised and the condemnation of the behaviour by 
social, legal and moral rules is neutralised. 
Social controls that serve to check or inhibit deviant motivational patterns are rendered inop-
erative, and the individual is freed to engage in delinquency without serious damage to his 
self image (Sykes & Matza 1957, p. 667). 
The five neutralisation strategies Sykes & Matza identified are: 1) the denial of responsibility, 
2) the denial of injury, 3) the denial of the victim, 4) the condemnation of the condemners 
and 5) the appeal to higher loyalties. 
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In the context of mass atrocities two of these mechanisms, namely the denial of responsibility 
and the condemnation of the condemners, can often be observed after the violence took place. 
First, denial of responsibility means that the perpetrators view themselves as an object rather 
than subject of their actions. Sykes & Matza (1957, p. 667) speak of a ‘billiard-ball concep-
tion where the individual “sees himself as helplessly propelled into new situations”. In the 
case of mass killings, this can be observed where the individual attacker claims to have been 
part of a group which they could not leave and whose demands they could not have rejected, 
describing themselves thus as helpless members overcome by the power of the group. 
Through the second mechanism, the condemnation of the condemners, the wrong-doing is 
neutralised by denying legitimacy of the sources for condemnations such as society, the state 
or the courts. This can frequently be seen in international criminal law where the relevant 
court is accused of victors’ justice and lack of legitimacy. In the context of armed conflict 
however, this usually happens only after the event when a new court system is set up or the 
proceedings of the International Criminal Court are triggered. Thus both of these techniques 
are post-event neutralisation strategies and can therefore be neglected in the group violence 
strategies model, which is more interested in explaining how the violence arises and less fo-
cused on the subsequent justifications. To what extent the post-event strategies have an im-
pact on the behaviour during the attack itself needs to be explored elsewhere. 
The three neutralisation strategies which are closely related to the group violence strategies 
model are 1) the denial of injury, 2) the denial of the victim and 3) the appeal to higher au-
thorities. These techniques are used to overcome the moral dilemma of violating one of the 
most central laws, namely the prohibition to kill. All three of these three neutralisation strate-
gies are facilitated by the macro level polarisation, such as media campaigns against the vic-
tim group or long-term persecution by the government, which seem to tolerate or even con-
done attacks on members of the victim group. Nevertheless it is unlikely that an individual 
could build up such a high level of neutralisation that he or she would be able to engage in 
mass violence. It is argued here that only through the facilitation of neutralisation at the 
mesa-level through the different inter- and intra-group interactions, neutralisation of partici-
pating in mass atrocities can be achieved. Neutralisation is inseparably intertwined with the 
group’s objective of achieving emotional dominance. The three relevant neutralisation strate-
gies will therefore be explored in Part V as part of the inter-group strategies. 
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2. Self-entrainment 
Another explanation for individual gross violence can be found in the phenomenon of what 
criminologists call self-entrainment (Collins, 2013b). In violent crimes, especially in domes-
tic violence, the assailant often continues the attack even though the victim is already over-
powered and beyond offering any resistance. Once the victim is completely helpless the in-
tensity of the physical attack even increases. Collins speaks of a ‘tunnel’ in which the attacker 
is only focused on him- or herself and loses awareness of the victim and the initial reason for 
the attack.  
The violent abuser has become entrained with him/herself; his consciousness narrows to his 
own anger, caught up in his own bodily rhythms of heavy breathing, shouting, hitting (Collins 
2013a, p. 141). 
This tunnel perception can only be upheld when and as long as the victim remains passive 
and does not distract the attacker through resistance. In the situation of armed conflict, the 
senseless slaughter of defenceless enemy combatants or unarmed civilians occur at the point 
when the attackers have established absolute dominance and there is no need for further vio-
lence (Collins, 2008). Collins (2013b) describes this state as an ‘emotional high’, which 
sometimes the attacker even tries to prolong. He cites the experience of a US Marine lieuten-
ant in Vietnam who recalls that “I could not come down from the high produced by the ac-
tion. The fire-fight was over, except for a few desultory exchanges, but I did not want it to be 
over” (p. 141). This state of self-entrainment is fostered by the encouragement of the offender 
group, especially by the cheering audience, but is also enabled by the passivity of the over-
whelmed victim group. Once the self-entrainment has ended, the killings stop and the remain-
ing victims are spared. After the My Lai massacre, US soldiers shared their lunch with Viet-
namese children only hours after the slaughter when they tried to make sure that not even 
children would survive (Kelman & Hamilton 1989). In Srebrenica, once the main killings 
were over, soldiers expressed reluctance to the further executions and would start arguing 
over who would have to kill wounded victims. Many Muslim men who were captured later 
were imprisoned rather than killed (Klusemann 2009). 
V. Inter-group Strategies 
The core of the group violence strategies model is the claim that the massacre are only possi-
ble if and as long as the attacking group has established emotional dominance. The violence 
is therefore carried out in a way that serves maximising emotional energy rather than military 
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victory. Thus, the pattern of violence is not dictated by the intended end result of the destruc-
tion of the group but rather by the offender group’s aim to create and maintain emotional en-
ergy dominance over the victim group in order to enable the violence in the first place. Mi-
cro- and mesa-level interact here very closely and cross-fertilise each other’s aims. While the 
group can only raise emotional energy where there is sufficient neutralisation on the individ-
ual level, it is the group dynamics which strengthens neutralisations of the individual to such 
a level where emotional energy reaches sufficient force. This is achieved through a number of 
dynamics within the group as well as in relation to the other group (see Part VI). Strategies 
within the group aimed to achieve emotional dominance are 1) polarisation and solidarity rit-
uals, 2) denial of the victimhood and injury, and 3) appeal to higher authorities. 
1. Polarisation and Solidarity Rituals 
It has often been demonstrated that the categorisation of groups is created outside the relevant 
population sections themselves. Hagan et al. (2005) for example strongly argue that compara-
tively fluid ethnic identities in Darfur preceded the state’s emphasis on a conflict between races 
and that the Sudanese government fostered the racial and ethnic divisions between Arabs and 
Black Africans, building on the competition for land and water resources. In general, different 
acts of polarisation, often maintained throughout the months or even years before the main 
massacre, not only help organising the attacks because the victim group can be easier identified 
(Pruitt 2014), they also establish emotional dominance of the offenders, because they foster the 
identification of the victims with the defeated and the offenders with the dominating group. It 
is therefore essential for the offender group to maintain the polarisation and to enforce the 
solidarity among the offending group through solidarity rituals like visual signs such as paint-
ing faces or distinguished cloth items, or chanting songs during the killings. The denial of vic-
timhood and injury (discussed below) also serve as solidarity rituals (Klusemann 2012). 
2. Denial of Victimhood and Injury 
The creation of separate group identities is closely linked to the portrayal of the victim group 
as an adversary to the offending group. This depiction of the victim group as the enemy has a 
number of functions in the build-up of emotional dominance. On the one hand this enforces 
polarisation into “us” and the “the other” and strengthens further solidarity within the group. 
In addition, it fosters the neutralisation strategy of denial of victimhood. “They had it com-
ing” is an often-used individual neutralisation strategy which denies the attacked individual 
the status of the victim. The targeted person is not seen as innocent but rather as one deserv-
ing the violence (Harrendorf 2014). “By a subtle alchemy the delinquent moves himself into 
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the position of an avenger and the victim is transformed into a wrong-doer” (Sykes & Matza 
1957, p. 668). The attack is seen as legitimate revenge or punishment. This understanding fits 
well in the general genocide propaganda, which usually blames the other group for previous 
attacks, low living standard or shortage of resources. “The minority group becomes the 
scapegoat for the dominant group and the problems of the state” (Pruitt 2014, p. 9). Thus the 
offender does not deny the general prohibition of killing but sees here the target as the ag-
gressor who needs to be punished and kept at bay. For example in Srebrenica the Serbs felt 
betrayed by the NATO bombing and thus justified attacking the Dutch NATO troops in the 
UN safe haven. Likewise the US soldiers who committed the My Lai massacre were in a state 
of revenge after losing many of their comrades in booby trapped mines and not being able to 
find any enemy combatants (Dutton et al. 2005). 
Related to the concept of denial of victimhood is the denial of injury. This occurs where the 
perpetrator is conscious of the illegality of the act but denies its moral wrongfulness. The vic-
tim group is portrayed as posing a threat which needs to be averted. Thus the perpetrators see 
themselves as acting in defence of the survival of their own group while the attack is justified 
as a necessary act of protection from future attacks by the victim group (Harrendorf 2014), or 
at least as a pre-emptive strike. For example, the Armenians were presented as the “fifth col-
umn” of the Russian Army (Levene 1998) and in Nazi Germany Jews were described as part 
of a Zionist conspiracy (Dutton et al 2005). In Rwanda, where there had been many mass kill-
ings on both sides, the fear of revenge killings by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) was 
consistently promoted by the Hutu (Dutton et al 2005) and pamphlets were distributed which 
depicted “Tutsis in Rwanda as a fifth column of the RPA that posed a threat and needed to be 
exterminated” (Klusemann 2012, 472). Pol Pot even exclaimed “if we wait any longer, the 
microbes can do real damage” (Chandler et al. 1988). In El Salvador the guerrillas were often 
referred to as cancerous, an infection or a virus which justified killing the whole family of a 
suspected guerrilla (Dutton et al. 2005). “If we don’t kill them now; they’ll just grow up to be 
guerrillas. We have to take care of the job now” (Danner 1994, p. 75). 
The self-defence argument alone is of course not sufficient to explain atrocities which are 
aimed at the extinction of the group, rather than only at controlling the group or expelling it 
from the region (so-called ethnic cleansing). Moreover, the individual attacker must realise 
that weaker members of the group such as children cannot be blamed for past crimes or old 
people are unlikely to be threat in the future. The notion of revenge and self-defence are how-
ever vital in neutralising the barriers to violence as well as creating a feeling of justification 
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which contributes to emotional dominance. Furthermore, the individual often has additional 
motives which will also strengthen his or her resolve. For example the rationalisation that a 
civilian village needs to be attacked because it allegedly supplies the enemy with food and 
shelter, is strengthened by personal material gain when looting the village.  
3. The Appeal to Higher Loyalties 
In this neutralisation technique offenders rely on their obligation to honour their duties to-
wards the group and prioritise it above law and social norms.  
Deviation from certain norms may occur not because the norms are rejected but because other 
norms, held to be more pressing or involving a higher loyalty, are accorded precedence 
(Sykes & Matza 1957, p. 669). 
This can reach such an extent that the deviant behaviour is not only justified, but it actually 
becomes the “right thing to do” (Dutton 2005, 456); what Staub (1999, p. 183) would call the 
“reversal of morality”. 
With regards to massacres this would mean that the loyalty for the state or the larger group, 
such as race or religion, prevails over the values of the international community, such as 
recognition of fundamental human rights. While international humanitarian law and human 
rights law were created to supersede distorted national laws, these international norms cannot 
overcome techniques of neutralisation. The reason for this is that the neutralisation technique 
of appeal to higher loyalties does not reject the norms themselves, but rather develop justified 
exceptions or defences to these norms. The appeal to the group interests as higher loyalties is 
of course closely linked to a strong identity with the group and thus overlaps with the polari-
sation and solidarity rituals. 
V. Intra-group Strategies 
In order to achieve emotional dominance the offender group not only acts in ways that raise 
their own emotional energy but are also aimed at lowering the emotional energy of the victim 
group. If successful, this creates such a strong feeling of helplessness, powerlessness and in-
feriority that the victim group becomes paralysed and unable to offer any resistance. The 
three main intra-group strategies are 1) building up the degrees of violence, 2) dehumanisa-
tion of the members of the victim group and 3) de-individualising of the victims.  
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1. Dehumanising 
A crucial part of lowering the emotional strength of the victim group is the dehumanisation 
and degradation of its members. Describing the victims as sub-human also removes the kill-
ing from the idea of homicide. As Erikson explains:  
People lose the sense of being one species and try to make other people into a different and 
mortally dangerous species, one that doesn’t count, one that isn't human . . . You can kill them 
without feeling that you have killed your own kind (Waller 2002, p. 244 cited in Hall 1983). 
The massacres are therefore described in euphuisms such as ‘cleansing’, ‘work’, ‘finishing 
the job’ (Human Rights Watch 1999) or ‘bush clearing’ (Feigenbaum 2012, p. 179) and the 
victims are compared to animals and vermin. Jews for example were called “bacteria” and 
Tutsis “cockroaches” (Pruitt 2014, p. 7). Chang reports on a soldier who explained, when re-
counting the Nanking atrocities, “When we killed her, we just thought of her as something 
like a pig” (Chang 1997, p. 50). In addition, the violence is accompanied by shouting abuses 
against the group identity (i.e. insults of race or religion). This is even true where the underly-
ing motives are not rooted in racial or ethnical prejudices against the other group. For exam-
ple Straus (2006) has shown that most perpetrators in the Rwandan genocide had no racial 
ethnic prejudices but nevertheless engaged in racist abuses of the victims during the killings. 
This can only be explained by the fact that these insults are part of the emotional build-up in 
order to overcome the physiological barrier against killing a fellow human being.  
The total dominance over the victims is also demonstrated by commanding them to make 
self-denigrating and derogatory comments about themselves and their group (Collins 2013a), 
which forces them to lower their own emotional energy. Intra-group strategies to create emo-
tional dominance also include forcing the victims to do degrading acts which demonstrate 
their subservience. In addition, victims are ordered to declare that they blame themselves for 
their suffering (Collins 2013a), as part of the neutralisation strategy of denying injury and de-
picting the victim as the aggressor. The widespread sexual violence also functions to lower 
the emotional energy, as it not only violates the individual victim but also the self-perception 
of the victim group, which in many traditional communities is understood as a direct attack 
on the honour of the male in his role as the defender. This is also true for attacks on the most 
vulnerable members of a group such as elders and children. 
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2. Building up the violence 
Interestingly, even in cases where the offender group is clearly stronger in either numbers or 
weapons, or both, there is rarely an immediate outbreak of mass violence. Instead, the vio-
lence builds up from oral assaults, destruction of property, killings of animals and single as-
sassinations to the outbreak of the full-blown mass killings. The reason for this is that in or-
der to commit the atrocity, military dominance is not sufficient if it is not also accompanied 
by emotional dominance. At the beginning of the confrontation, the offender group has not 
yet established the necessary emotional energy to overcome the tension and fear of its mem-
bers. At the same time the emotional energy of the victim group is still so high that they 
would offer full resistance to any immediate attack. The small skirmishes, raids and sniping 
attacks between Serbs and Bosnian Muslims throughout the two years before the Srebrenica 
atrocity are examples for a situation in which the emotional energy of both groups are tested 
out and neither has achieved emotional dominance yet. The incremental building up of vio-
lence before the main killing is therefore needed for both strengthening the emotional energy 
of the own group and at the same time lowering the emotional energy of the victim group. 
The lowest form of violence are verbal abuses. From hindsight of the mass killing even the 
strongest insults seem to be negligible to the violence committed later, but at the beginning 
these verbal abuses go far beyond what would be acceptable in ordinary life. ‘Fuck your 
Turkish mothers!’ (Klusemann 2009, p. 7) is such an offensive insult that it signifies the 
break-down of the ordinary. The initial insults tear down the barriers of respect and acknowl-
edgement of the honour of the other person. The oral violence is the first step of breaking the 
physical barrier of violence as well as the first steps in the struggle for emotional dominance. 
Thus insults and taunting should not simply be taken as an expression of genocidal intent, ra-
ther they serve various functions at the individual as well as at the intra-group level. 
The next step in the build-up of the violence is a number of initial minor attacks, such as kill-
ing cattle or destroying outhouses. These initial acts of violence intimidate the victim group 
and thus help to establish dominance of the attacking group. Where these acts can be commit-
ted without serious repercussions or resistance of the victim group, they help create a trium-
phant atmosphere raising high emotional energy levels. In addition these individual minor 
acts constitute to a further step towards the killing of human beings for which still the con-
frontational tension/fear barrier exists. The initial acts against objects rather than human be-
ings or against cattle help to gradually overcome the general barrier against killing members 
of the own species. 
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Once the emotional dominance is achieved, the violence only lasts as long as this dominance 
can be maintained. One strategy to maintain emotional dominance, in addition to the continu-
ing humiliations of the victims, are the so-called killing games. These are actions that com-
bine the act of killing with humiliating rituals, such as running the gauntlet. These cruel 
games are not simply an expression of hatred of the victim group. First of all, these rituals 
make the killing as such much less effective, as they unnecessarily slow down the progress. 
Secondly, it has been observed many times that these killing games start only after the mass 
killing has already gone on for some while (Klusemann 2012, Chang 1997). This seems to 
show that the killing games are not simply an expression of loathing towards the victims but 
rather fulfil a function in the group violence strategies, namely prolonging the state of domi-
nance. The same is true for the mass rapes which start only after the mass killings have be-
gun. Related to the killing games are other forms of extreme violence, which break universal 
taboos of human interaction. One is sexual violence committed in front of family members or 
forcing victims to commit incestuous acts with each other. Another is the cruel killing of chil-
dren (including babies) in front of the parents (Hersh 1970) as well as mutilations of the 
corpses.  
3. De-Individualisation of the Victims 
In addition to dehumanising the victim and building up the violence towards the main killing, 
another function of intra-group actions are aimed at de-individualising the victims, which en-
ables individuals overcoming their physiological barrier to violence. 
The first strategy of de-individualisation is to avoid looking the victims in the face. The face 
and eyes are the most direct expression of humanity and facing them increases the confronta-
tional stress. Collins argues that this is the reason why most victims of professional assassina-
tions are shot from behind (Collins, 2008) and most knife killings are committed by stabbing 
in the back (Collins 2013a). Likewise Grossman (2009) found that both in prisons as well as 
in police raids, there is more violence where the faces of either the attackers or the victims are 
hidden under hoods. In mass atrocities the victims are very often rendered ‘faceless’ through 
being blindfold or shot from behind or lying face down (Klusemann 2012). Browing (1992) 
compares different examples of executions of Polish Jews by the Nazis and found that where 
the victims were lying face down and shot in the back of the head, the killers were much less 
likely to try to avoid the order to execute compared with cases where they could see the faces. 
This fits also within the neutralisation strategy of denial of injury. When the attacker stands in 
15 
 
front of an individual it is more difficult to hold up the myth that this particular person is an 
aggressor, guilty of past crimes and a dangerous threat for the future. 
Another strategy of de-individualisation is to avoid facing the victim on a one-to-one basis. 
Most killings are committed by groups against groups rather than by individuals against indi-
viduals. Very often the victims are herded together even though this is not always the most 
effective way of killing. Both in the My Lai massacre as well as in many mass killings in 
Rwanda, rather than killing the victims in the buildings where they were found, they were 
first dragged out and then killed in groups (Dutton 2005). Thus a group of victims was killed 
by a group of offenders rather than individual victims by individual offenders. In this way 
both attackers and victims became de-individualised. 
All three main intra-group strategies, dehumanising, building up the violence and de-individ-
ualisation of the victims, serve a number of functions both in fostering individual neutralisa-
tion techniques as well as creating and maintaining emotional dominance over the victim 
group. The audience plays a crucial role in both inter-group as well as intra-group strategies 
to build up the necessary emotional dominance both by encouraging the offenders and by har-
assing the victims (Klusemann 2012). This can, for example, be observed in Srebrenica 
where “Bosnian Serb civilians from surrounding villages provided an audience for the perpe-
trators and helped to maintain a triumphant atmosphere by harassing/taunting victims or call-
ing for particular people to be executed”(p. 472). Klusemann (2012) argues that this encour-
agement by the audience was necessary for the mass killings to occur, even though the Serbs 
had enough weapons to kill the unarmed victims anyway. The applauding and encouraging 
audience is not only helping to raise emotional energy but also help the offender to create the 
impression that their actions are condoned and thus strengthen the individual’s neutralisation 
strategies. This is also true for the by-standing audience themselves, who have to overcome 
the fact that they are committing the crime of incitement to murder.  
VI. Conclusions 
This paper has demonstrated that when looking at mass atrocities neither the forms of vio-
lence nor the extent of cruelty can be sufficiently explained by conventional motives such as 
ethnic hatred and group polarisation. In order to be able to understand how individuals over-
come both physiological and ethnical barriers to violence against their own species and par-
ticipate in the most gruesome acts, the group violence strategies model explores the interac-
tions between micro- and mesa-levels. It has been shown that the traditional neutralisation 
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model can be translated into acts of mass killings but on its own it is not enough to explain 
the behaviour of individual perpetrators. Rather it is at the group level where the individual 
neutralisation is strengthened to the necessary degree and where emotional energy dominance 
is established and maintained. Indeed, this paper argues that the extent of the violence, which 
goes beyond only taking life, is not rooted in propaganda fuelled polarisation and orches-
trated hatred; rather it is needed to enable the individual to commit the killings in the first 
place. Thus mass atrocities cannot be explained without taking the group violence strategies 
into consideration. For this purpose the group violence strategies model combines traditional 
criminological theories and restructures them into a three level analyses, examining the strat-
egies employed at individual inter-group and intra-group level.  
Encompassing the level of the individual perpetrator and the group dynamics on the ground at 
the time of the atrocity, it is hoped that the group violence strategies model offers a new ap-
proach of analysis which will complement current genocide studies and make a contribution 
to a more complex and nuanced understanding of mass atrocities                  . 
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